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Abstract
In recent years, wireless Internet service providers
(WISPs) have established thousands of WiFi hot spots in
cafes, hotels and airports in order to offer to travelling
Internet users access to email, web or other Internet ser-
vice. However, two major problems still slow down the
deployment of this kind of networks: the lack of a seam-
less roaming scheme and the variable quality of service
experienced by the users. This paper provides a response
to these two problems: We present a solution that, on the
one hand, allows a mobile node to connect to a foreign
WISP in a secure way while preserving its anonymity and,
on the other hand, encourages the WISPs to provide the
users with good QoS. We analyse the robustness of our
solution against various attacks and we prove by means of
simulations that our reputation model indeed encourages
the WISPs to behave correctly.
1 Introduction
Wireless data services based on cellular networks, such
as GSM/GPRS, provide users with very good coverage.
However, they have several intrinsic and well-known
drawbacks: the offered bitrates are relatively low (and this
is unlikely to change with the Third Generation), and the
deployment of new features is hampered by several fac-
tors such as the large size and oligopolistic behavior of the
operators, their willingness to provide homogeneous ser-
vice, and the huge upfront investment; in addition, very
often, a user located in his home country is not allowed to
obtain service from the competitors of his home network.
The deployment of wireless networks such as WiFi
in unlicensed frequencies makes it possible to envision
a substantial paradigm shift, with very significant bene-
fits: much higher bandwidth network, deployment based
possibly on local initiative, higher competition and much
faster time-to-market for new features.
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This may, in turn, pave the way for new types of ser-
vices, whether these require higher bandwidth, lower per-
bit costs, reduced energy consumption for the mobile
nodes or higher reliance on fast-changing and locally pro-
vided content.
The current, rapid deployment of hot spots reveals the
strong potential of this approach. However, two major
problems still need to be solved. The first problem is the
provision of a seamless roaming1 scheme that would en-
courage small operators to enter into the market. This is
a fundamental issue for the future of mobile communica-
tions. Indeed, without an appropriate scheme, only large
stakeholders would be able to operate their network in a
profitable way, and would impose a market organization
very similar to the one observed today for cellular net-
works; one of the greatest opportunities to fuel innovation
in wireless communications would be missed. The sec-
ond problem is the guarantee of a good quality of service
provision to the users.
This paper provides a response to these two challenges.
By appropriately unbundling the major functions of the
network, it institutes a virtuous cycle of deployment and
usage: Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISP) will
be encouraged to deploy their network and will be confi-
dent that mobile users registered with other WISPs2 will
pay for the service they receive; likewise, users will be as-
sured that the WISPs are under the scrutiny of all the other
users (including the roaming ones), and that they will be
informed about their degree of satisfaction.
As we will see, the solution is relatively simple, pro-
vided that the roles of the different entities are clearly de-
fined. We describe these entities in detail, along with the
security protocols and the charging mechanism. In order
to facilitate user acceptance, the proposed solution mini-
mizes user involvement: once the mobile device has been
initialized, it can make all decisions autonomously.
One of the major goals of this work is to build up trust
between mobile users and WISPs. For this reason, we pro-
1Note that by roaming we designate the operation of obtaining ser-
vice from different operators, and not the handoff between access points
(managed by the same provider or by two different providers). The hand-
off problem is out of the scope of this paper.
2Unlike [1], we require the mobile node to be registered with a home
WISP.
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vide a detailed threat analysis and we show that the pro-
posed protocols can thwart rational attacks and detect ma-
licious attacks (we define these terms in Subsection 2.2).
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way:
In Section 2 we present the system and trust models and
we give an overview of the proposed solution. In Sec-
tion 3, we describe the details of the protocols. We study
the security of the protocols and analyse some interest-
ing aspects of the solution in Section 4. In Section 5, the
simulations are described and the results are analyzed. Fi-
nally, we present the state of the art in Section 6 and we
conclude in Section 7.
2 System Model
In this paper, we consider a mobile node MN that wants
to connect to the Internet via a neighboring hot spot (i.e.,
a hot spot that is within its power range); we assume the
hot spot to be managed by a Wireless Internet Service
Provider (WISP) that we denote by S (see Figure 1). MN
is affiliated with its home WISP H3 with whom it has an
account and shares a symmetric key kHM . We assume
that all the messages exchanged between MN and H go
through S. Note that it is possible to have S = H .
Figure 1: The mobile node MN is affiliated with a home WISP H and
chooses to connect to the Internet via a hot spot managed by the WISP S
(it is possible to have S = H). S and H are registered with the trusted
central authority TCA.
All WISPs in our model are registered with the trusted
central authority4 TCA that creates for each of them a pub-
lic/private key pair and a certificate of their public key and
of their identity.
In this paper, we present a reputation based mechanism
that, on the one hand, allows MN to evaluate the behav-
ior of the WISPs and, on the other hand, encourages the
WISPs to provide the users with good QoS. Each WISP in
our model has what we call a reputation record that rep-
resents an evaluation of its behavior and that is generated
and signed by TCA. The choice of the initial reputation
record of a WISP is discussed in Section 5.
3The solution works even if H does not operate access points itself.
4In a “grassroots” vision, the TCA would be a federation of WISPs,
who join forces to centralize a few strategic functions. In a more con-
ventional vision, the TCA can be under the control of a world-wide or-
ganization much as a quality control company, a certification company,
or a global telecommunications operator. TCA can be distributed, as
certification companies are, to avoid being a bottleneck.
In order to make sure that the mobile nodes pay for
the service they receive, we also propose a credit-based
micro-payment scheme (see Subsection 3.1.1) that is
highly inspired from the PayWord scheme [19]. Our solu-
tion takes into account the fact that MN is a ressource re-
strained mobile device and therefore has much less com-
puting and storage resources than TCA, H or S.
2.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions in this paper:
• The public key of TCA is known by all other entities.
• H and S can use their public keys to establish a tem-
porary symmetric key kHS . We assume that this key
is generated prior to the execution of our set of pro-
tocols.
• S is able to predict the QoS it can offer to a mobile
node that is willing to connect to one of its hot spots.
We will discuss this issue more in detail in Subsec-
tion 5.3.
• The backbone is a commodity; the rewarding of the
backbone operator should follow already established
practices and techniques, and will not be addressed
in this paper (we assume that S, H and TCA have an
appropriate agreement to have connectivity - e.g., a
flat rate subscription).
2.2 Trust and adversarial model
We consider an attacker A that wants to perform an at-
tack against our protocols (see Subsection 4.1 for the list
of attacks). A can be a mobile node or a WISP. We assume
that:
• TCA never cheats and is trusted by the other parties
for all the actions it performs.
• The WISPs (here S andH) are rational and therefore
they cheat (i.e., perform one of the attacks presented
in Subsection 4.1) only if it is to their advantage (i.e.,
they gain something from cheating). This assump-
tion is reasonable because a WISP is typically sta-
tionary and therefore it is possible to shut it down
if it cheats; the WISP is thus likely to be motivated
by economic incentives, and would not be inclined
to disrupt the communication of mobile nodes (who
could simply choose another WISP if this were to
occur).
• MN may be malicious and therefore it can cheat
(i.e., perform one of the attacks presented in Subsec-
tion 4.1) even if there is no gain from cheating (this
implicitly assumes that MN can also perform rational
attacks).
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• MN trusts H for managing its account.
• Several attackers can collude and share information
(possibly their secret keys) to perform more sophis-
ticated attacks.
Confidentiality of data is not an issue in our case, so we
do not consider passive attacks where the attacker eaves-
drops the data exchanges between two parties. Note that
this is an orthogonal issue that is easily addressed using
standard security techniques.
We consider exclusively attacks performed against the
different phases of our protocols, meaning that we do not
consider other arbitrary attacks like DoS attacks based on
jamming for example.
In this paper, we want to study the effect of rational
and malicious attacks on our set of protocols. Our goal
is to make sure that our solution thwarts rational attacks,
detects malicious attacks and, if possible, identifies the
attacker.
2.3 Rationale of the solution
When MN wants to connect to the Internet, it identifies
the neighboring WISPs5 and contacts them (see Figure 2).
Each WISP sends to MN an offer that contains its reputa-
tion record, the QoS it proposes and the price it asks for.
Then, MN selects the WISP S that proposes the best offer
and verifies its identity. S also verifies, with the help of
H , that MN is a valid node. MN and S establish a con-
tract, inform TCA and H about it and establish a secure
session by setting up a symmetric key kMS .
This secure session is divided into parts. During the i-
th part, MN sends a payment proof for the i-th part of the
service and S provides that part of the service. The pay-
ment proofs and the services are secured using the shared
key kMS .
At the end of the connection, MN assesses the QoS it re-
ceived, compares it to the QoS advertised by S during the
session setup and informs TCA about its satisfaction level.
S also sends the payment proof(s) toH which charges MN
and remunerates S according to the received information.
TCA collects the feedback about the different WISPs,
updates periodically the reputation records according to
the collected information and provides the WISPs with
their new reputation records.
5Note that we refer to the access points using the identities of the
WISPs that are managing them.
Figure 2: The proposed solution
3 Proposed Solution
3.1 Basic mechanisms
3.1.1 Micro-payment scheme
As already mentioned in Section 2, the payment
scheme we use in this paper is highly inspired from the
PayWord scheme [19]: During the session setup, MN gen-
erates a long fresh chain of paywords w0, w1 , ..., wn by
choosing wn at random and by computing wi = h(wi+1)
for i = n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 0, where h is a one-way hash
function and n is the maximum number of payments that
MN can send to S during the session. Then, MN reveals
the root w0 of the payword chain (which is not considered
as a payword itself) to S, H and TCA.
During the session, MN sends (wi , i) to S as a payment
proof for the i-th part of the service. S can easily verify
wi using wi−1 that is known from the previous micro-
payment or from w0 if i = 1. At the end of the service
provision, S contactsH and presents the last payment (w`
, `) it received. H verifies the validity of w`, pays S the
amount corresponding to ` paywords and charges MN for
that amount by manipulating its billing account.
We use this micropayment scheme because it allows
an offline verification of the payment proofs and because
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of its low computational and storage cost for the mobile
nodes.
3.1.2 Authentication of MN by H
As stated in Section 2, all communication between MN
and H goes through S. Therefore, in order to preserve the
anonymity of MN regarding S, we use the following au-
thentication mechanism, that is commonly used in the in-
dustry (e.g., SecurID [11]): When MN gets affiliated with
H , the two parties share a random seed s that represents
the input to a pseudorandom generator. The output is a
random number tag that is 30 to 50 bits long. H keeps a
small window (e.g., 50 entries) of upcoming tags for each
mobile node and maintains the pairs (tag; node’s iden-
tity) in a sorted database. Upon receipt of a given tag, H
searches its database, retrieves the pair (tag;identity) and
identifies MN. In case of collision (i.e., more than one pair
contains the random number tag), H asks MN to send the
next tag value.
3.2 Details of the protocols
3.2.1 Selection of the WISP
When it wants to obtain Internet access, MN scans the
spectrum, identifies the neighboring WISPs and asks them
an offer by broadcasting the following request message:
OfferReq = [ReqID ,nM ] (1)
where ReqID is the request identifier and nM is a nonce
generated by MN. Each WISP W willing (and able) to
provide service at that time responds by a signed offer
OfferW :
W → MN : OfferW ,SpkW (OfferW ,nM ) where
OfferW = [W ,RRW ,AQW ,PW ,Cert(W )] (2)
where RRW is the most recent reputation record of W
(signed by TCA), AQW is the QoS it advertises6, PW is
the price it is demanding for each part of the service (see
Subsection 3.2.4), pkW is its private key and Cert(W ) is
the certificate of its public key PKW .
Upon receipt of the offers, MN verifies the freshness of
nW and identifies the best offer. This choice depends on
the relative importance that MN gives to the parameters
RW , QW and PW (as shown in Section 5, these parame-
ters can depend on the application MN intends to run) and
should be made by a software agent to automate the pro-
cess and avoid human involvement. More sophisticated
schemes (e.g., auctioning) can be envisioned in order to
select the best offer.
6W may advertise a QoS that is higher than the real QoS (RQW ) it
is able to offer to MN. The consequences of such a behavior are studied
in Section 5.
Then, MN verifies the certificate and the signature of
the WISP that proposed the best offer. If the verification
is incorrect, MN checks the second best offer and so on.
We denote the selected WISP by S.
3.2.2 Verifying that MN has a valid account
Before starting the session, S has to make sure that MN
is a valid mobile node that is registered with a valid home
WISP. As we want to preserve the anonymity of MN,
the verification of MN’s identity involves H and uses the
authentication mechanism described in Subsection 3.1.2.
We have thus the following messages exchanged:
MN → S : M = [H , tag ,nM
EkHM (MN ,S , tag ,nM )] (3)
S → H : S ,nS ,M,MACkHS (S ,M) (4)
H → S : TID ,EkHM (TID ,nM , kMS ),
EkHS (TID ,nS , kMS ) (5)
S → MN : TID ,EkHM (TID ,nM , kMS ) (6)
(3) MN sends to S a message M containing, in clear,
the identity of H , its current tag and a freshly generated
nonce nM . M also contains, encrypted using the sym-
metric key kHM , the identities of MN and S, the tag and
the nonce nM .
(4) S sends to H its identity, a freshly generated nonce
nS , the message M and a MAC computed on both items
using the key kHS .
(5) H searches its sorted database, identifies MN using
the tag sent in clear (as explained in Subsection 3.1.2),
looks up the symmetric key it shares with MN and uses
it to decrypt the rest of the message. Then, H re-checks
the identity of MN (the identity corresponding to the tag
should also correspond to the identity MN encrypted in
the message) and verifies that the WISP with which MN
intends to interact is the one that sent the message.
If the message is not correct, H informs S that MN is
not affiliated with it by sending a negative acknowledge-
ment. If, on the contrary, the message verifies correctly,
H generates a symmetric key kMS that MN and S will
use later as a session key (i.e., all the messages exchanged
between MN and S during the session are secured using
kMS ). Then, H constructs a message containing:
• in clear, a fresh temporary identifier TID for MN
(MN will use this identifier later during its interac-
tions with S),
• TID , nM , and kMS encrypted using the symmetric
key kHM , and
• TID , nS , and kMS encrypted using the symmetric
key kHS ,
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and sends this message to S. H maintains a table contain-
ing the correspondence between the temporary identifiers
and the identities of the nodes; given TID , H can posi-
tively identify the correspondent MN.
(6) S decrypts EkHS (TID ,nM , kMS ), verifies that the
temporary identifier in the decrypted part corresponds to
the one sent in clear and compares the nonce in the de-
crypted part with the one generated by MN. If these ver-
ifications are correct, S removes EkHS (TID ,nM , kMS )
from the message and forwards the rest to MN.
MN decrypts EkHM (TID ,nH , kMS ) and verifies the
temporary identifier and the nonce as S did. If everything
is correct, MN maintains TID in memory.
Note that if S = H , MN sends message (3) to H and
H responds with message (6).
3.2.3 Contract establishment and communication
During this phase, MN generates a long hash chain of
n + 1 elements, computed from a randomly chosen seed
wn as described in Subsection 3.1.1. Then MN generates
a contract C as follows:
C = [CID ,w0 ,RS ,AQS ,PS ]
where CID = [TID ,S ,H ] is the contract identifier and
w0 is the root of the hash chain.
Then MN and S inform H about the contract:
MN → S : C ,MACkMS (C ),MACkHM (C ) (7)
S → H : C ,MACkHM (C ),MACkHS (C ) (8)
(7) MN sends the contract C to S, together with two
MACs computed on C using the symmetric keys kMS and
kHM , respectively.
(8) S verifies C and MACkMS (C ) and if they are cor-
rect, it computes a MAC on C using the symmetric key
kHS it shares with H . Then, S sends to H the contract C
and the MACs computed with kHM and kHS . H verifies
the MACs and, if they are correct, it stores the contract C.
MN and S also inform TCA about the contract:
MN → S : EPKTCA(C , kMT , pad),
MACkMS (EPKTCA(C , kMT , pad)) (9)
S → TCA : C ,EPKTCA(C , kMT , pad) (10)
TCA→ S : SpkTCA(C ),MACkMT (C ) (11)
S → MN : MACkMT (C ) (12)
(9) MN generates a fresh symmetric key kMT that
MN will use later to encrypt data for TCA (see Subsec-
tion 3.2.6). In order to prevent the key retrieval by an
attacker, MN uses the probabilistic encryption by append-
ing to the key a pseudorandomly generated bitstring pad
(the length on the bitstring depends on the encryption al-
gorithm used). Then, MN encrypts C, kMS and pad using
the public key of TCA, computes a MAC on this data us-
ing the key kMS it shares with S and sends the encrypted
data and the MAC to S.
(10) S verifies the MAC, removes it and sends C and
the encrypted data to TCA.
(11) TCA decrypts the data and compares the contract
C received in the encrypted data with the contract re-
ceived in clear from S. If they are identical, TCA signs
the contract C using its private key pkTCA, computes a
MAC on it using the symmetric key kMT that is shares
with MN, and sends the signature and the MAC back to
S. TCA also maintains C and kMT in its local database.
(12) S verifies the signature and if correct, it forwards
the MAC to MN which verifies it and stores kMT .
3.2.4 Service provision and payment
The session is subdivided into parts, depending on time
or on the amount of data exchanged between MN and S.
During the i-th part:
MN → S : TID ,wi ,MACkMS (TID ,wi) (13)
S → MN : i-th part of the service,
MACkMS (i-th part of the service)(14)
(13) MN sends to S its temporary identity TID, the i-th
PayWord wi and a MAC computed on both items using
the key kMS .
(14) S verifies the validity of wi by checking that
h(wi) = wi−1, where h is the one-way hash function used
by MN to generate the chain. If it is correct, S provides
MN with the i-th part of the service.
3.2.5 Sending the payment request
At the end of the session, S sends to H a payment re-
quest PR that contains, encrypted using kHS , the contract
identifier CID, the last hash value w` it received from MN
and the number ` of provided service parts. PR also con-
tains, in clear, the identity of S so thatH is able to retrieve
the symmetric key kHS .
S → H : PR = [S ,CID ,w`, `,MACkHS (S ,CID ,w`, `)](15)
Upon receipt of PR, H verifies the validity of w` as ex-
plained in Subsection 3.1.1, retrieves the price PS from
the contract, rewards S for the ` parts of the service, and
charges MN. H is also remunerated (see details in Sub-
section 3.3).
3.2.6 Sending the satisfaction level
At the end of the session, MN generates a satisfaction
level message Sl as follows:
Sl = [EkMT (CID ,QoSEvalS ,CID ,w`, `)] (16)
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QoSEvalS ,CID is expressed by MN and compares to what
extend the QoS it obtained during the session is complaint
with the QoS announced by S in the offer. kMT is the key
MN shares with TCA.
Then, MN reports on its satisfaction level to TCA:
MN → S : TID ,Sl ,MACkMS (TID ,Sl) (17)
S → TCA : S ,CID ,w`, `,Sl ,
SPKS (S ,CID ,w`, `,Sl) (18)
(17) MN sends to S its temporary identifier TID, Sl data
and a MAC computed on both items.
(18) S verifies the MAC. If it is correct, S generates a
message containing CID, w`, ` and Sl, signs it and sends
the message and the signature to TCA.
TCA verifies the signature and retrieves the key it shares
with MN (using CID). Then TCA decrypts Sl, compares
the CID, w`, ` in the encrypted data to those received in
clear from S and if they are identical, TCA considers Qo-
SEval as a valid feedback. Then TCA informs H that it
correctly received the feedback:
TCA→ H : Ack ,S ,CID ,
SPKTCA(Ack ,S ,CID) (19)
(19) H verifies the signature and retrieves the identity
of MN (using CID). Then, H remunerates MN a small
amount of money ε, which is meant to encourage the mo-
bile nodes sending the reports.
3.2.7 Updating the reputation record
TCA collects the information about the satisfaction lev-
els for a given period and then, at the reputation up-
date time, TCA updates the reputation record of each
WISP, signs them and informs the WISPs about their new
records. The new reputation record depends on the old
one and on the collected information. An example is given
in Section 5.
TCA considers the absence of feedback as negative
feedback. Indeed, TCA knows that a session has been
established between MN and S and that H is the home
WISP of MN (see Subsection 3.2.3). TCA is thus waiting
for the report from MN about its interaction with S, and
not receiving it within a “reasonable” time is considered
as bad feedback.
3.3 Charging and rewarding model
In this subsection, we summarize the charging and re-
warding mechanism we use in this paper:
• During session setup, MN generates a chain of pay-
words w0, w1 , ..., wn.
• During the secure session with S, MN sends (wi, i)
to S as a payment proof for the i-th part of the ser-
vice.
• H remunerates MN a small amount ε when it re-
ceives from TCA the confirmation that MN reported
on its interaction with S.
If, at the end of the session, MN moves away from
S (and therefore cannot send the feedback via S), it
is still possible for MN to report on its satisfaction
level to TCA via another WISP W : W includes its
identity in message (18) and signs the message using
its own private key. TCA then verifies the signature
and informs H in message (19) about the identity of
W . Then H gives both MN and W a reward ε/2.
• At the end of the session, S sends to H the last
payment proof (w`, `) it received from MN. H veri-
fies the validity of the payword w`, charges MN the
amount PS ∗ ` corresponding to the ` parts of the
service and rewards S, using a well-established e-
payment technique, the amount7 PS ∗ ` − ε. If TCA
receives no report from MN, ε is handled according
to some policy (e.g. it can be distributed to charity).
• The home network H is also remunerated. This
can be done e.g., if MN pays a flat monthly sub-
scription A or if MN pays an amount a per session.
The two approaches are equivalent if we consider
that a = A/nbSessions where nbSessions repre-
sents the average number of sessions established by
MN during one month. For sake of simplicity, we
consider the second approach in this paper. A nu-
merical example is given in Section 5.
4 Security assessment
4.1 Attacks
In this Subsection, we identify the attacks that an at-
tacker8 A may want to perform against our protocols (see
Subsection 2.2 for the trust and adversarial model). We
identify the following attacks that are specific to our solu-
tion:
• Publicity attack: In the offer it sends to MN, S ad-
vertises a QoS that is higher than the real QoS it can
offer.
• Selective publicity attack: S performs the Publicity
attack with a specific MN.
7As already mentioned, ε is the reward MN receives if it reports on
its satisfaction level to TCA.
8As mentioned in Subsection 2.2, A can be a mobile node or a WISP.
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• Denigration attack: MN receives a good QoS from
S but pretends the contrary by sending a negative re-
port on the satisfaction level or by not sending the
report at all.
• Flattering attack: MN sends systematically a good
feedback about S’s behavior to TCA. This attack
makes sense particularly if S = H .
• Report dropping attack: MN sends the report but S
does not transmit it to TCA.
• Service interruption attack: S receives the i-th pay-
ment proof from MN but does not provide the corre-
sponding part of the service.
• Refusal to pay attack: MN does not send the i-th pay-
ment to S.
• Repudiation attack: S or MN retracts the agreement
it has with other party (e.g., S asks for higher price
than agreed on when the contractC was established).
We also consider general attacks such as:
• Packet dropping attack: A drops a message it is
asked to forward or discards a message it is asked
to generate and send.
• Filtering attack: A modifies a packet it is asked to
forward or generate.
• Replay attack: A replays a valid message that was
exchanged between two legitimate parties.
We do not consider the case where a MN is compro-
mised but not duplicated (e.g., the the mobile device in
stolen): Well-established mechanisms (e.g., blocking the
node’s account) can be used in this case.
4.2 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we will analyse the robustness of our
protocols against these attacks.
Publicity attack: If S does not provide MN with the
promised QoS, MN will send a negative report to TCA.
If this attack is repeated, the cumulation of the negative
reports will affect the future reputation records of S. If
on the contrary, this attack is performed rarely, it will not
affect much the reputation of S but S gains almost nothing
from performing this attack; as S is rational, it will not
perform this attack.
The same reasoning holds if S=H with, in addition, the
possibility for MN to punishH by choosing another home
WISP.
Selective publicity attack: The anonymity of the mo-
bile nodes prevents S (if S 6= H) from performing the
Publicity attack against a specific MN. The only possible
selection would be based on the home network (i.e., S
performs the Publicity attack with all the MNs affiliated
with a given home network). S gains nothing from this
attack and thus S will not perform it.
Denigration attack: If MN does not send the report on
the satisfaction level, H will not give it the ε reward and
TCA will consider the absence of feedback as negative
feedback. Therefore, this attack is not rational for MN.
So it is more interesting for MN to send a negative feed-
back instead of not sending the report at all: The effect of
the attack is the same and at least MN will get paid for the
sending. But this attack is still not rational. Indeed, MN
gains nothing from sending a negative feedback instead of
a positive one (the cost of the sending remains the same).
Such behavior is thus purely malicious.
This attack is not harmful for the WISP, unless it is per-
formed systematically and by a high number of colluding
attackers. However, TCA can statistically detect it if the
following events happen frequently9:
• The MNs affiliated with H always pretend that they
received a bad QoS from a given WISP (from a
given hot spot managed by that WISP), whereas
many other MNs report on a good QoS on that very
WISP10. As the selective publicity attack is not pos-
sible, this situation is suspect.
• H never receives reports from MNs affiliated with H
about the sessions they established with S.
• The MNs affiliated with H pretend that the QoS was
bad but at the same time the duration of the session
and the amount of data exchanged prove that the QoS
was good11.
Note that this attack comes with an important cost: if
an attackerAwants to alter the reputation of S by parking
misbehaving nodes close to the hot spots managed by S,
A should own many devices and devote them to the attack.
Note also that this colluding attack may harm very small
WISPs (with few number of hot spots) - if the attacker
pays the price - but it is much too costly against WISPs
with hundreds or thousands hot spots.
9The higher the number of events is, the more accurate the detection
is. Note that statistical detection techniques do not hold if the majority
of the nodes are misbehaving, which is not likely to be the case in WiFi
networks.
10In order to have more accurate detection, TCA can consider each
access point of the WISP separately.
11TCA knows the root w0 of the hash chain from the contract and
knows well from the report; it can therefore estimate the mount of data
exchanged between MN and S.
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Flattering attack: It is not rational for MN to send a
positive feedback if it receives a bad QoS from S, unless
it has an incentive to do so (e.g., S remunerates MN for
the reports).
This attack improves the reputation of the targeted
WISP only if it is performed systematically and by a high
number of colluding attackers. The detection mechanism
can be similar to the one proposed for the Denigration at-
tack.
However, a specificity of this attack resided in the fact
that H can create “virtual” MNs (i.e., MNs that have an
account but are not necessarily real devices), emulate con-
nections with them and make them systematically send
positive feedback. This leads to a cost that is much lower
than the cost of the Denigration attack but TCA can detect
it if (i) the MNs affiliated with H rarely connect to for-
eign WISPs (or at least much less than average) or if (ii)
H is not rewarded for the connections it established with
a high number of MNs affiliated with it (if we assume that
this information is available to TCA).
Report dropping attack: If S expects a negative feed-
back, it may want to drop the report on the satisfaction
level instead of transmitting it to TCA. But as the absence
of feedback counts as negative feedback, this dropping
does not help S. Furthermore, the report may be posi-
tive: Assuming that the feedback is defined between val-
ues minRep and maxRep, not receiving the report corre-
sponds to a feedback of minRep. This attack is therefore
not rational for S.
Service interruption attack: If S refuses to provide the
i-th part of the service, MN will keep asking for it (by
sending again the i-th payment). After a predefined num-
ber of retransmission requests, MN will end the session,
which prevents S from providing more service parts (and
thus earning more money) and at the same time affects the
satisfaction level of MN.
If nevertheless, we want to prevent S from receiving the
i-th payment without providing the i-th part of the service,
we can use the payment system presented in [5].
Refusal to pay attack: If MN does not send the i-th
payment, S will not provide the i-th part of the service
and the session will end (after a predefined number of re-
transmission requests). This attack is then not rational: It
prevents MN from receiving the service part but does not
harm S.
Repudiation attack: This attack is not possible because
H and TCA receive the contract C from both MN and S
(Messages 8 and 10). The two copies should be identical,
otherwise TCA will not send the message 11 and the ses-
sion setup will not terminate. Therefore, once the session
is established, MN and S cannot retract their agreement.
To prevent S or MN from sending a correct information
to TCA but not to H , we can also require a response from
H to establish the session.
Packet dropping attack: If a message is not generated
or is dropped during session setup, the secure session will
not be established. If A= MN (i.e., MN does not gener-
ate messages 1, 3, 7 or 9), it will not be able to connect to
the Internet but does not harm S. IfA= S , it will not pro-
vide the part of the service to MN; MN will select another
WISP and S would lose an opportunity for revenue.
If during the secure session, the payment proof or the
part of the service is not generated or is dropped, the entity
that is waiting for it asks for retransmissions (if needed
several times). If it does not receive the message, the se-
cure session is closed.
If S does not forward the satisfaction level of MN, it is
equivalent to the denigration attack (see Subsection 4.2).
If S does not generate the payment request and sends it
to H (Message 15), it will not get rewarded for the service
parts it provided to MN.
Filtering attack: The messages exchanged between the
different parties in our protocols are cryptographically
protected, using MAC computations or digital signatures.
Therefore, any modification of a message will be detected
at the receiver. Therefore, tampering with a message is
equivalent to not sending the message at all (an incorrect
message is discarded) and it is treated in the same way
(see the Packet dropping attack).
Replay attack: During session setup, the messages ex-
changed between the different entities (Messages (2) to
(6)) are protected using nonces; the delayed messages are
detected and discarded.
During the secure session: the payment proofs and the
parts of the service arrive in sequence; a replay is imme-
diately detected and discarded.
During session closing, the payment request (Mes-
sage (15)) and the satisfaction level (Messages (17) and
(18)) are expected only once; a replay is immediately de-
tected and discarded.
4.3 Overhead
In this subsection, we evaluate the computation and
communication overhead of our solution for a mobile
node. We consider only the mobile node because it is
the only entity that is severely ressource restrained and
because in this way we cover all the wireless communica-
tions.
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4.3.1 Computation overhead
During the different phases of our protocols, we use
symmetric key and public key cryptography primitives to
secure the message exchange and to correctly authenticate
the different parties involved in the communication. We
minimize however the use of public key cryptography, es-
pecially by the mobile nodes, to reduce the computation
cost of our solution.
Hence, MN uses public key primitives only for two
messages: it verifies the certificate, the signature and the
reputation of the WISP it selects (Message 2) and it en-
crypts a message for TCA (Message 9). For all other mes-
sages, MN uses symmetric key cryptography primitives:
5 + 2` MAC operations (` being the total number of ser-
vice parts), 2 symmetric key encryptions and 1 symmetric
key decryption.
Public key operations are also used in the message ex-
change between TCA and the two WISPs S and H (Mes-
sages 11, 18 and 19). It is however possible to commute
them into symmetric key operations, if we assume that S
and TCA establish a symmetric key when they first begin
their interaction.
Note that the existence of a tamperproof resistent hard-
ware at MN is not necessary for the good functioning of
our protocols, but it may be a good solution for protecting
the long term symmetric key kHM that MN shares withH .
4.3.2 Communication overhead
Table 1 provides reasonable values of the size of the
different fields appearing in our protocol.
Field Name ReqID IDs nM ,pad wi `
Size (bytes) 4 16 20 20 2
Field Name MAC PK QoS, P, R k tag
Size (bytes) 16 150 1 16 6
Table 1: Size of the fields used in our protocol
ReqID is encoded on 4 bytes to reduce the risk of using
the same identifier for two different requests. The identi-
fiers of the WISPs and the nodes (W , H , S, MN and TID)
are encoded on 16 byte (assuming e.g. an IPv6 format).
The paywords wi are encoded on 20 bytes (assuming e.g.
SHA) and the QoS (AQ and QoSEval), the reputation R
and the price P are encoded on 1 byte (which is enough
to encode values between 0 and 100). The symmetric
keys kHM , kHS , kMS and kMT are encoded on 16 bytes
(128 bits) and the public keys are encoded on 150 bytes
(assuming e.g. RSA, see [13]). We encode the nonce nM
and the pad on 20 bytes, the tag on 6 bytes (see Subsec-
tion 3.1.2) and MAC on 16 bytes. Finally, we encode ` on
2 bytes to support long sessions.
We consider the example where MN is downloading a
1 MB file. The file is divided into 1 KB packets and each
50 packets represent a part of service (` = 20 parts of
service in total). Using the values of Table 1, an end-to-
end session between MN and S represents an overhead,
for MN, of 18337 bytes, which represents an overhead per
packet of around 18 bytes (i.e., less than 2% of the packet
size).
5 Reputation mechanism assess-
ment
Our solution motivates the different players to partici-
pate in the reputation mechanisms. Indeed:
• W is motivated to provide MN with the QoS it
promised because otherwise the feedback of MN will
be negative (see the analysis of the Publicity attack in
Subsection 4.2).
• MN is motivated to report on its interaction with W
because it receives a refund ε.
• W is motivated to forward the report (see the analy-
sis of the Report dropping attack in Subsection 4.2).
However, we want also to study the effect of the repu-
tation mechanism on the behavior of the WISPs, i.e., the
QoS they effectively offer to the mobile users. We there-
fore implemented our set of protocols using ns-2 simula-
tor [10].
Using these simulations, we want to verify that:
• The WISPs are encouraged to provide the MNs with
a good QoS;
• The WISPs are discouraged from advertising a QoS
that is different from the QoS they can really offer;
• It is possible for a WISP that has a bad reputation
record to improve its reputation.
5.1 Simulations setup
5.1.1 Decision making at MN
During the WISP selection phase, MN receives several
offers from the WISPs. For each offer OfferW , MN com-
putes a value DW = RepαW ·AQβW · P−γW . It then deter-
mines DS = maxWDW and selects the WISP S.
• RepW is the reputation of the WISP W : It is a value
between minRep=0 and maxRep=100.
• AQW is the QoS advertised by W : For sake of sim-
plicity, we also assume that it is a value between min-
QoS=0 and maxQoS=100.
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• PW is the price W is demanding for each part of the
service.
• The exponents α, β and γ are parameters that depend
on the application MN is running and that are used to
emphasize the importance of the variables (RepW ,
AQW or PW ). We consider as an example the two
following applications:
– Chat: The user is most likely to choose the
WISP that asks for the lowest price. Therefore,
we set α, β and γ to 2, 1 and 3, respectively.
– File transfer: The user is most likely to choose
the WISP that offers the highest QoS. There-
fore, we set α, β and γ to 2, 2 and 1, respec-
tively.
Note that:
• In order to minimize the human involvement, the
user should set the parameters α, β and γ, for each
family of applications, once and for all. However, he
should have the possibility to modify them if needed.
• The traffic model (i.e., the frequency at which the
packets are sent from S to MN) is the same for
the three applications. The only difference is in the
choice of the parameters α, β and γ.
• If two (or more) WISPs have the same DW , one of
them is selected at random.
More sophisticated utility functions can include criteria
such as the minimum QoS MN is expecting or the maxi-
mum price it is willing to pay.
5.1.2 Service provision and QoS
The real QoS RQS received by MN can be differ-
ent from AQS (the QoS advertised by S during session
setup).
During the implementation of our set of protocols,
we represented the behavior of S whose real QoS is
RQS , 0 ≤ RQS ≤ 100 as follows12: Each time S has to
provide a “part of service”13 to MN, it sends it with a prob-
ability RQS/100 . If MN does not receive the packet, it
sends a retransmission request to S. After 4 unsuccessful
retransmission requests, MN closes the session with S.
The time during which MN is waiting for the packets and
asking for retransmissions represents a delay that justifies
the decrease of the QoS offered by S.
12As mentioned in Subsection 5.1.1, we assume that minQoS=0 and
maxQoS=100.
13For sake of simplicity of explanation, we consider in our implemen-
tation that the provider sends one part of service per packet.
5.1.3 Satisfaction level report
At the end of each session, MN evaluates the real QoS
it received from S. There can be different levels of sat-
isfaction for this evaluation. We provide here a simple
example based on packet counting:
RQS = max (0 ,
nbPkts − nbRetReq
nbPkts
·maxQoS )
where nbPkts is the total number of packets it received14
from S and nbRetReq is the number of retransmissions it
had to request.
Then, MN compares RQS to AQS by computing:
QoSEvalS ,CID =
RQS
AQS
5.1.4 Reputation records update
TCA updates the reputation records every 2000 sec-
onds. The new reputation newRepS of S is computed as
follows:
newRepS = λ · RepS + (1 − λ) ·
∑
CID QoSEvalS ,CID
nbSessionsS
where RepS is the current reputation of S, nbSessionsS
is the number of sessions established by S (and already
closed) during the last 2000 seconds and feedbackS is the
sum of all QoSEvalS received over all these sessions (the
absence of feedback is considered as negative feedback,
i.e., QoSEvalS = 0 ). λ represents the “weight of the
past” and is set to 1/2 in our simulations.
Note that if S advertises a QoS that is lower than the
real QoS it offers (i.e., AQS < RQS ), we will have
QoSEvalS > maxRep, which may lead to a new repu-
tation that is also higher than maxRep. If it is the case,
TCA keeps newRepS as it is in its database but sends to S
a new reputation record equal to maxRep.
5.1.5 Simulation environment
We consider a network of 5 WISPs and 50 MNs. The
WISPs are numbered from 1 to 5 and for each WISP, we
define the advertised QoS, the real QoS and the price it
asks for each part of the service. We initialize the repu-
tation of the WISPs to maxRep = 100 . MNs and WISPs
are static15 and each WISP is a home WISP for 10 MNs.
Each simulation lasts for 50000 seconds and the reputa-
tion updates are made every 2000 seconds.
We consider that a WISP W is:
14In the special case where nbPkts = 0 (i.e., MN receives no packet
from S), we have RQS = 0.
15All MNs are within the power range of all WISPs, it is therefore
useless to consider mobility in this case.
10
• “honest” if it advertises the real QoS it is offering
(i.e., RQW = AQW ),
• “misbehaving” if it advertises a QoS that is higher
that the real QoS it is offering (i.e., RQW < AQW ),
• “modest” if it advertises a QoS that is lower than the
real QoS it is offering (i.e., RQW > AQW ).
We conducted three sets of simulations to study three
aspects of our solution:
Set 1: We want to study the reaction of the network if
all the WISPs are honest but offer different QoSs:
WISPs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 advertise and offer QoS = 60,
70, 80, 90 and 99, respectively16. We consider the
two following scenarios:
Scenario 1.1: All the WISPs ask for the same price.
At the beginning of a simulation, we assign to
each MN, with equal probability, one of the two
following applications: chat or file transfer (see
Subsection 5.1.1).
Scenario 1.2: The WISPs ask for prices that are
proportional to their QoSs (PW ∼ RQW ). We
expect the choice of the application to have an
effect on the results, so we run 3 sets of simula-
tions; one for each kind of application (i.e., all
the nodes run that application).
Set 2: We want to study the reaction of the network to the
presence of misbehaving WISPs and modest WISPs:
WISPs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 advertise AQ = 60, 70, 80, 90
and 99, respectively; but all of them offer RQ = 80.
We consider the two following scenarios:
Scenario 2.1: All the WISPs ask for the same price.
At the beginning of a simulation, we assign to
each MN, with equal probability, one of the fol-
lowing applications: chat or file transfer.
Scenario 2.2: The WISPs ask for prices that are
proportional to their QoSs (PW ∼ RQW ). We
expect the choice of the application to have an
effect on the results, so we run 3 sets of simula-
tions; one for each kind of application (i.e., all
the nodes run that application).
Set 3: We assume that all the WISPs are honest, offer the
same QoS and ask for the same price. At the be-
ginning of a simulation, we assign to each MN, with
equal probability, one of the following applications:
chat or file transfer.We want to study the effect of
the initial reputation of a WISP that opens its ser-
vice. We assume that the newcomer is WISP 1 and
we consider the three following scenarios:
16We do not consider the case where AQ = 100 because such a
perfect case is probably not possible in real life conditions.
Scenario 3.1: The initial reputation of WISP 1
equals the one of the other WISPs
(Rep1 = maxRep = 100 because the WISPs
are honest).
Scenario 3.2: The initial reputation of WISP 1
is lower than the one of the other WISPs
(Rep1 = 50 ).
Scenario 3.3: The initial reputation of WISP 1
is lower than the one of the other WISPs
(Rep1 = 50 ) but WISP 1 asks for a lower
price.
5.2 Simulation Results
We run 10 simulations for each of the scenarios listed in
Subsection 5.1.5. Each WISP W is characterized by the
triplet (AQW ,RQW ,PW ) (See the legend in Figures 3 to
11). The results are the following:
Set 1: The results of Scenario 1.1 show that if all the
WISPs ask for the same price, almost all the users select
the WISP that offers the best QoS (WISP 5 in Figure 3).
The other WISPs (mainly WISP 4) can occasionally have
some clients because the randomness introduced for the
service provision at the WISPs (see Subsection 5.1.2) may
lead to a slight decrease in WISP 5’s reputation.
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Figure 3: Scenario 1.1: All the WISPs are honest and ask for the same
price. Therefore, WISP 5, which offers the highest QoS, eventually gets
most of the users.
The results of Scenario 1.2 show that if all the WISPs
offer different QoSs and ask for different prices, the
choice of the users depends on the application they are
running; e.g., if the nodes run a chat application (see
Figure 4), the majority of the nodes choose the WISP 2
whereas if the nodes run a file transfer application (see
Figure 5), the majority of the nodes choose the WISP 5
that offers the best QoS.
Note that in Scenario 1.2, nodes running the chat appli-
cation do not choose WISP 1 even if it offers a lower price
than WISP 2. By analyzing the data, we realized that this
is because the reputation of WISP 2 is significantly higher
11
than the one of WISP 1, which is caused by the random-
ness introduced, for the service provision, at the WISPs
(see Subsection 5.1.2).
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Updating periods
N
um
be
r o
f p
ar
ts
 o
f s
er
vic
e
WISP 1 (60,60,60)
WISP 2 (70,70,70)
WISP 3 (80,80,80)
WISP 4 (90,90,90)
WISP 5 (99,99,99)
Figure 4: Scenario 1.2: All the nodes run a chat application. They
choose WISP 2 which asks for a low price and at the same time has a
good reputation.
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Figure 5: Scenario 1.2: All the nodes run a file transfer application.
They choose WISP 5 because it offers the best QoS.
These results clearly prove that:
• the WISPs are encouraged to provide a good QoS
and
• honest WISPs offering different QoSs can co-exist in
the same network.
Set 2: The results of Scenario 2.1 show that if all the
WISPs ask for the same price, most of the users select the
WISP that offers the best real QoS (WISP 3 in Figure 6).
Modest WISPs (here WISPs 1 and 2) and misbehaving
WISPs (here WISPs 4 and 5) are selected much less often.
Note that the mobile nodes have no direct indication
on the real QoS of the WISPs. They are however able
to correctly evaluate the behavior of the WISPs because
the correspondence between the advertised QoS and the
real QoS is taken into consideration in the updating of the
reputations.
The results of Scenario 2.2 show that almost all the
nodes that run the chat application (see Figure 7) choose
WISP 1 that offers the lowest price and at the same time
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Figure 6: Scenario 2.1: All the WISPs ask for the same price. The
only honest WISP, here WISP 3, eventually gets most of the users.
has a very good reputation. The majority of the nodes
running a file transfer application (see Figure 8) choose
WISP 3 because it offers the best real QoS.
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Figure 7: Scenario 2.2: All the nodes run a chat application. They
choose WISP 1 because it asks for the lowest price and at the same time
has a good reputation.
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Figure 8: Scenario 2.2: All the nodes run a file transfer application.
They choose WISP 3 because it offers the best real QoS.
These results clearly prove that the WISPs are discour-
aged from misbehaving (i.e., to advertise a QoS that is
higher than the real QoS they can offer) and from being
modest (i.e., advertising a QoS that is lower than the real
QoS they can offer).
Set 3: In Scenarios 3.1 and 3.2, all the WISPs offer the
same QoS and ask for the same price.
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The results of Scenario 3.1 show that if WISP 1 has,
when it opens its service, the same reputation as the other
WISPs, it has more or less the same probability to get
clients as others do (see Figure 9).
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Updating periods
N
um
be
r o
f p
ar
ts
 o
f s
er
vic
e
WISP 1 (90,90,15)
WISP 2 (90,90,15)
WISP 3 90,90,15)
WISP 4 (90,90,15)
WISP 5 (90,90,15)
Figure 9: Scenario 3.1: WISP 1 has, when it opens its service, the
same reputation as the other WISPs (Rep = 100 ); it has more or less
the same probability to get clients as others do.
The results of Scenario 3.2 show if WISP 1 has, when
it opens its service, a reputation that is lower than the rep-
utation of all other WISPs, it has no chance to get clients.
(see Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Scenario 3.2: WISP 1 has, when it opens its service, a
lower reputation than for the other WISPs; it has no chance to get clients.
In Scenario 3.3, all the WISPs offer the same QoS
and all of them, except WISP 1, ask for the same price;
WISP 1 asks for a much lower price (3 times less than for
the others). The results show that by decreasing the price
it is asking for, WISP 1 can “reintegrate” the network and
get the clients.
Note that even if according to the results WISP 1 gets
almost all the clients, it is not interesting for it to keep
the price very low because it will probably not cover its
expenses; lowering the prices can therefore be consid-
ered a way of “launching” (if the initial reputation is not
maxRep) or of “redemption” (if the WISP damaged its
own reputation because it misbehaved).
These results clearly prove that:
• the initial reputation of the WISPs should be set to
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Figure 11: Scenario 3.3: WISP 1 has, when it opens its service, a
lower reputation than for the other WISPs but it asks for much lower
price; it eventually gets all the clients.
maxRep, not to oblige them to lower their prices17.
If afterwards they do not offer a good QoS or if they
misbehave, they will be punished as we showed in
the previous scenarios.
• if the reputation of a given WISP decreases because
it misbehaves, this WISP is still able to reintegrate
the network. However this reintegration comes with
a cost (i.e., asking for a price that is much lower than
usual).
5.3 Prediction of the QoS offered by the
WISP
In Subsection 2.1, we assume that S is able to evaluate
the QoS it provides to the mobile nodes; in the simplest
implementation, this QoS would be limited to the mean
bitrate; more sophisticated solutions would consider ad-
ditional parameters such as the provided peak rate, the
maximum delay, and the maximum delay jitter; this would
be notably the case with IEEE 802.11e [12]. Indeed, the
proper operation of our protocols requires S to be able to
predict the QoS that it will be able to offer (see the results
of the second set of simulations in Subsection 5.2).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no well-
established QoS “prediction” technique in CSMA/CA
network. We propose the following, statistics-based so-
lution: while it operates, S maintains:
• the history of its connections with the mobile nodes,
• the QoS it was able to offer to them, and
• the conditions under which this QoS provision was
possible, such as (i) the number of MNs served si-
multaneously per hot spot; (ii) the number of neigh-
boring access points (i.e., taking interference into ac-
count); (iii) the period of the day (e.g., peak hours,
17A WISP trying to cheat by changing its identity would be detected
by the TCA (because it has to register with it each time).
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etc.); (iv) the period of the year (e.g., working day,
week-end, holidays, etc.).
Using this information, S predicts the QoS it can offer.
It can then for example decide to what extent it wants to
“overbook” itself. This QoS prediction can be combined
to the use of a Differentiated Bandwidth Allocation simi-
lar to the one proposed in the CHOICE architecture [2].
6 State of the art
Reputation-based systems: These systems are mainly
used to build trust and foster cooperation among
a given community. The efficiency of reputation
mechanisms have been widely studied in various
fields and with different approaches. Studies such
as [8, 17, 18] consider the effect of online reputation
systems [6] on e-marketing and trading communities
like e-Bay. Reputation mechanisms are also used to
foster cooperation in peer-to-peer networks [7] or in
ad hoc networks [4, 14].
But, from all these studies, we cannot draw a clear
conclusion about the efficiency of reputation sys-
tems; each of these mechanisms should thus be ana-
lyzed on a per-case basis.
Roaming in WISPs: The deployment and success of
WiFi networks is slowed down by the lack of inter-
operability between WiFi providers (also called frag-
mentation problem [15]): A client that has an ac-
count with a WISP A cannot connect to a hotspot
managed by a WISP B. However, the situation is
changing and more and more WISPs are establish-
ing roaming agreements (similar to what is done for
cellular networks). The roaming can be between
providers within the same country (e.g., T-Mobile
and iPass in the US) or international (e.g., between
the British BT and the American Airpath).
Another solution would be to use the service of
a WiFi roaming operator like Boingo Wireless [9].
Such an operator tries to solve the roaming problem
by having agreements with as many WISPs as possi-
ble. Then it aggregates all the hot spots managed by
these WISPs into a single (seamless) network. How-
ever, Boingo does not consider the problem of the
variable QoS in WiFi networks.
In [16], Patel and Crowcroft propose a ticket based
system that allows mobile users to connect to for-
eign service providers: The user contacts a ticket
server to acquire a ticket, requests a service from a
service server and uses the ticket to pay for that ser-
vice. However, unlike the solution we present in this
paper, the authors do not question the honesty of the
service providers i.e., they assume that the service
providers provide the users with a good quality of
service, which is far from being guaranteed in WiFi
networks.
In [3], the authors consider also the problem of inter-
operability between the WISPs and use a reputation
system to foster good QoS provision. However, their
solution differs from ours in two main points. The
first difference is the trust model: The authors con-
sider that even if H is itself a WISP, it plays only
the role of a home network and is trusted by all other
parties. On the contrary, S is considered as rational
(i.e., it can cheat if it is beneficial). We think that this
assumption is inconsistent because H can be a home
WISP for some nodes but, at the same time, a for-
eign WISP for other nodes; assuming that it will be
rational and honest at the same time makes no sense.
The second difference is in the content of the paper:
In [3], the authors (i) present the rationale of the so-
lution but do not present the details of the protocols;
(ii) due to the absence of the security details, they
present only a rough analysis of the security offered
by their solution; finally, (iii) they do not evaluate
their reputation system.
7 Conclusion
The work presented in this paper describes a simple so-
lution that enables a mobile node to connect to a foreign
wireless Internet service provider in a secure way while
preserving its anonymity and meanwhile discouraging the
WISPs from intentionally providing the mobile users with
a bad QoS.
We have analyzed the robustness of our solution against
different attacks and we have shown that our solution
thwarts rational attacks, detects malicious attacks and
identifies the attacker.
We have proved by means of simulations that the
WISPs are encouraged to provide the MNs with a good
QoS and, at the same time, discouraged from advertising
a QoS that is different from the QoS they can really offer.
In terms of future work, we plan to study more in detail
the prediction of the QoS the WISPs can offer to their
clients and the cheating detection techniques. We also
plan to investigate the feasibility of a “multi-hop WiFi net-
work” (i.e., a WiFi network that is extended using multi-
hop communications) in terms of network performance
and security.
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